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Minimalists about human rights hold that a state can have political legitimacy if it protects a 
basic list of rights and democratic rights do not have to be on that list. In this paper, I consider 
two arguments from Benhabib against the minimalist view. The first is that a political commu- 
nity cannot be said to have self-determination, which minimalists take to be the value at the heart 
of legitimacy, without democracy. The second is that even the human rights protections 
minimalists take to legitimize institutions cannot be had without democracy. These rights can 
only be adequately interpreted and specified for any social context if the interpreta- tions and 
specifications result from democratic processes. Here, I bring out some important problems with 
these arguments and so conclude that they do not represent a robust case for rejecting 
minimalism.  
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For two pillars of contemporary liberal thought, the relationship between democracy and 
human rights is, as they say, complicated. In her rich and engaging book, Seyla Benhabib 
responds to one type of view on this rela- tionship, held by authors like John Rawls, 
Charles Beitz and Joshua Cohen who are human rights ‘minimalists’. They hold that 
protecting a limited list of human rights is necessary for a state to be legitimate but a right 
to demo- cratic institutions does not need to feature on that list, hence the minimalist 
label. Benhabib, on the other hand, holds the radical thesis that democracy is both an 
intrinsic requirement for political legitimacy and for enjoying human rights. In this short 
paper, I consider her two central arguments for those conclusions and argue that each 
falls short of presenting a robust case against minimalism.  
Benhabib’s first argument is that the very reason minimalists attribute legitimacy to some 
non-democratic orders – their valuing of self-determination – requires democracy. A 
society can only have genuine self-determination if it has democratic institutions. There 
are no plausible empirical examples, Benhabib challenges, of a regime that is both 
legitimate in the sense of exemplifying self-determination and yet is un-democratic. What 
would an  
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undemocratic society have going for it? Minimalists might stick to their guns, and stress 
that such societies can at least show concern for their members by protecting human 
rights. Benhabib’s second argument aims to cut off this line of thought by showing that 
only democratic decision-making can give human rights the kind of specific content 
needed to apply them concretely. Human rights ideals need to be interpreted in specific 
social contexts and many inter- pretations might be possible. Yet, the only morally 
legitimate way to settle which of these should be applied is by democratic deliberation. If 
democracy is needed to give concrete content to human rights, then human rights cannot 
be minimal sources of legitimacy; democracy must come first as a source of legitimacy in 
a political order.  
Both arguments are problematic. Whilst democratic social arrangements might epitomize 
egalitarian justice, the best account of justice, distributive or political, is not obviously the 
right threshold for legitimacy. A number of theo- rists have attempted to articulate the 
idea of a community that is concerned enough for its members, pursuing a common good 
conception of justice and seeking to collectively arrive at just arrangements, to act 
legitimately even if it gets it wrong about what justice ultimately demands. Legitimacy is 
not the value of correctly allocating all distributive and political rights in line with the 
best account of equality. It is the value of having the social warrant to pursue a com- 
munal answer to the question of what equality requires. Full-blown political equality, of 
which democracy will be a part, is an account of what political arrangements best 
exemplify equality. The question is whether a society might get it wrong about the best 
account of political equality and still have social war- rant to try to get it right about that 
and justice more generally. Plausibly, protect- ing fundamental human rights shows 
sufficient communal concern for citizens to set a threshold above which fallibility on the 
justice question is permitted. Benhabib problematically runs together justice and 
legitimacy, an equivalence that minimalists reject, and that elision makes her case for 
democracy as the threshold for legitimacy plausible. Benhabib’s second argument is that 
giving any concrete content to human rights necessarily requires democratic delibera- 
tion. Against this, I argue that the claim relies on an elision between rights that can be 
legitimately pursued in a society and those rights we have in principle. Societies can 
legitimate pursue the wrong content for some rights, such as those of justice. But that 
does not mean human rights fail in principle to have an objec- tively right content, 
independently of what society legitimately decides. A plausi- ble role for human rights is 
to set the limits on how wrong a society can go.  
Benhabib defines democracy in terms of respect for democratic rights, rather than in 
terms of processes (Benhabib 2011, p. 79 – page numbers in text will refer to Benhabib 
2011 from now on, unless otherwise stated). These rights, constituting the ‘right to have 
rights’, include rights to life, liberty, personal property, equal freedom of thought; 
freedom of expression and association, and rights to representation, self-government and 
some basic bundle of socio- economic goods (p. 127). They are morally valuable because 
they recognise  
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persons as worthy of equal concern and as having a status worthy of protection by their 
polity and world community (pp. 60, 62). They protect individuals’ ‘communicative 
freedom’: the ability to freely and equally engage in collective deliberations and 
decisions on the social rules under which they should live under (pp. 60, 68, 71). Social 
rules emanating from free deliberation under such a scheme of rights and only rules 
emanating from such collective deliberation are, in Benhabib’s view, legitimate (pp. 67, 
69, 74). In this way democracy legi- timates the imposition of social requirements.  
It seems reasonable to hold that the concepts of justice and political legiti- macy are 
distinct. After all, how can social institutions even attempt to dis- cover or achieve a just 
social arrangement without the social warrant to embark on that project? Surely, too, 
societies must be allowed some degree of fallibility in their attempts at just arrangements, 
so long as these attempts do not undermine the very point of trying: concern for the lives 
of their members. Some theorists have, for this reason, proposed a distinction between the 
grounds for legitimate political rule and the justice of political arrangements. The moral 
value underpinning legitimate rule is distinct from the values under- pinning justice; the 
warrant to exercise social power in seeking just arrange- ments can have something going 
for it even if it falls short of the realisation of justice. Of course, the very same value 
underpinning legitimacy must place limits on what can be socially authorised; arbitrary or 
seriously wrongful exer- cises of power will have nothing going for them at all. If one 
accepts this legit- imacy-justice distinction, then some social measures can count as 
legitimate, carrying moral authority for those subject to them, without necessarily being 
fully just. A government can have the social warrant to pursue social measures, so long as 
they do not fall below the minimum threshold of legitimacy, even if the motivation 
behind those measures is a mistaken notion of what justice demands.  
Minimalist theorists have developed conditions for legitimacy understood in this way. 
They also, however, distinguish legitimacy from democracy, in that their minimal 
conditions of legitimacy do not contain democratic rights. For example, Rawls proposes 
that to have one kind of legitimacy: to merit recogni- tion as a polity with the right to 
freely create laws and engage in relations with other states, a society must satisfy 
conditions of well-orderedness (Rawls 2001, pp. 64–67). These include protections for a 
basic list of human rights, a working legal system in which the rule of law operates, with 
judges applying a common good conception of justice, and some mechanism for 
consulting citizens as to their views on government decisions, though not necessarily a 
democratic mech- anism. Dworkin similarly proposes that protection of a schedule of 
human rights for citizens is a legitimacy threshold for a state (Dworkin 2011, pp. 335ff.).  
Benhabib specifically targets Rawls, Beitz and Cohen, as minimalist theo- rists. For 
Beitz, the point of human rights is to see the threshold for legitimacy that trumps external 
international intervention in the affairs of a state. Regimes can satisfy such a threshold 
without protecting fully democratic rights  
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(Beitz 2009, p. 189). Presumably, this is because self-determination can be served 
without democracy properly speaking (Beitz 2009, p. 183). Cohen holds that so long as 
certain conditions necessary for self-determination are in place, a state can be legitimate 
without being democratic (Cohen 2004, Benhabib 2011, p. 85). The conditions are that 
political decisions arise from, and are accountable to, processes in which everyone’s 
interests are represented; there are rights to dissent for all; and public officials justify 
decisions in terms of a widely held notion of the common good. The values underpinning 
legitimacy here are those of membership and inclusion (Cohen 2004, p. 213).  
Benhabib’s rejection of minimalist conceptions of legitimacy is based on the claim that 
only a society with democratic rights can truly exhibit self- determination, or the values 
underpinning it (pp. 78, 85). Furthermore, she challenges minimalists to give any 
empirical example of a society that does not protect democratic rights, or ‘democratic 
equality’ (p. 78), and can yet be said to express the values underpinning self-
determination (p. 85). Indeed, Benhabib charges that minimalist tests for legitimacy are 
likely to pass unsa- voury types of regime, paternalisms and benevolent despotisms (pp. 
85, 87). In the Rawlsian version of minimalism, regimes that deny equal freedoms (of 
religion, of expression and association, of minorities and of women) will also pass the 
legitimacy test (p. 88). For this critique to work, Benhabib needs to hold that no plausible 
moral value we might offer as underpinning legitimacy can be served by undemocratic 
social arrangements.  
It is true that paternalist government or benevolent despotisms are not the best 
expressions of, say, political equality. But the legitimacy question is not about the best 
form of government, as a matter of egalitarian social arrange- ments. Rather it asks 
whether a form of government, including these imperfect forms, can be warranted, 
morally, to act politically. That threshold would have to be set by a different value than 
that of having already got it right about fully fledged political equality. Consider the 
value of having a community in which there is genuine concern for fellow community 
members, even where ideas about decision-making and authority are confused. A 
traditional society where decisions are left to elders, or those with supposed accumulated 
wisdom, does not seem automatically to signal the absence of communal concern. Of 
course some indicator is needed that there is communal concern for members of a 
society, and it is plausible that human rights and some mechanisms for deliber- ation 
should play this role. They, after all, protect individuals from the kind of interference to 
which tyrannies resort in order to avoid losing power and maintain enforced social 
cohesion.  
Benhabib challenges that we are hard pressed to find empirical examples of societies that 
are both non-democratic and plausibly legitimate. Yet, this may simply be because 
empirically, societies without democratic rights tend to be societies that do not respect 
key human rights. Moreover, perhaps legitimacy is not an all-or-nothing quality of a 
society. Those laws in a society that do respect rights upholding minimal communal 
concern, even if not democratically  
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established, could be said to legitimately uphold the rule of law. A monarchy might 
institute habeas corpus, and it is not obvious that this initiative is illegiti- mate. To the 
extent that key human rights are protected in such societies they can be said to exhibit 
values like communality, mutual concern or a genuine col- lective commitment to 
achieving justice. Getting it wrong about justice, includ- ing the justice of full political 
equality, is not sufficient for absence of communal concern, and so is not sufficient for 
illegitimacy. The minimalist case, being built on human rights exhibiting communal 
concern, then, is not touched by the critique.  
Benhabib’s second argument, if successful, would cut off this minimalist case at the root. 
It is that one cannot even have human rights without democ- racy. For any social context, 
the specification of moral equality through human rights depends intrinsically on there 
being democratic law-giving institutions (p. 127). Basic access to social rights requires 
that human rights be realised and specified in law (pp. 62, 68). In fact she claims, contra 
Sen, that human rights proper only exist when moral rights are translated into justiciable 
duties in a legal system (p. 82). Furthermore, the realisation of human rights neces- sarily 
requires an interpretation of those rights, and one according to the social context in which 
they will be applied (pp. 74, 88, 125, 128). So there will be variation in the specification 
of the rights, but the only variation that can be legitimate is that arrived at through 
democratic deliberation. This variation is not an option but an intrinsic part of working 
out what human rights mean beyond very abstract statements (pp. 74, 127). So 
democratic legitimation is not optional — it is intrinsic to legitimately varying the 
content of human rights.  
If this argument is right, then human rights cannot be a minimal source of legitimacy 
given that, to be legitimate, the varying interpretations through which they are realised 
must be underwritten by a democratic procedure. In fact, in order to have human rights at 
all beyond ‘hollow’ ideals one needs democratic procedures that legitimately interpret 
and apply them as social rules (pp. 68, 73, 74, 82, 125).  
Now, it is important to clarify how this argument works. The reason that human rights are 
said to be reliant on democratic deliberation is that to move from abstract principles to 
justiciable social rules the former must be inter- preted and interpreted with due regard to 
the social context (pp. 74, 80). There are two possible senses of contextual interpretation 
that matter here. Either the interpretation is sensitive to objective contextual features such 
as conditions and resources, or the interpretation must be sensitive to subjective 
contextual features such as the shared views or understandings of the political 
community. Benhabib seems to mean the latter as the contextual basis for varying the 
content of human rights standards (pp. 71, 74, 80). This also fits the claim that only 
democratic deliberation, with people freely arriving at a collective interpretation, can 
result in legitimate variation on how to apply the abstract principles. If variations in the 
content of human rights result from free  
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deliberation then those variations are due to the views, opinions and judge- ments of the 
deliberators. No instructions accompany free deliberation, con- straining what direction it 
should take (which is what it means to say that democratic deliberation is prior to human 
rights). If variation tracked objective contextual features, then the variations resulting 
from democratic deliberation would not necessarily offer the right interpretation of the 
content of the rights. Democracies could get it wrong about the relevant contextual 
differences.  
There are two problems with this argument. The first is that it does not entail the 
conclusion Benhabib wants: the priority of democracy. Given that genuine legitimacy-
imparting deliberation is defined in terms of a set of rights, the ‘right to have rights’, then 
those rights too will be subject to variation. Varying interpretations will need 
legitimating. In order to know whether a state genuinely exemplifies democracy-based 
legitimacy, then, we will need to know whether its governing interpretation of democratic 
rights is itself legitimate – an acceptable riff on an abstract ideal. The only way round this 
whilst still holding the variation thesis would be to argue that democracy-defining rights 
are different from other rights in not requiring contextual application and inter- pretation. 
This seems implausible. There is no obvious feature of such rights, and Benhabib 
presents none, to single them out as especially ‘self-interpreting’. In fact her account of 
the right to have rights, see above, is a somewhat extensive subset of the standard human 
rights list plus rights to democratic decision-making processes (p. 127). One might say 
the content of these rights is given by their clear moral purpose: free, collective and 
deliberative decision- making (communicative freedom). But any morally justified right 
will have a clear moral purpose, at least in the sense of serving a moral value. If rights 
can only have concrete content through legitimate variation, democracy is not prior to 
human rights as democracy is itself defined in terms of rights.  
One could answer that we need to start somewhere, and that developing a specification of 
democratic rights, including the democratic ones, is a herme- neutic process – a back-
and-forth discussion that has to have a starting point, albeit with tentative and revisable 
first steps (p. 71). But given the steps are those being made by a social order in relation to 
citizens, we need to know when a first, or any, step in that process is legitimate and 
democracy was offered as a candidate solution for this problem.  
The second problem with this argument is that it runs together the justified content of 
rights with their legitimate application in a polity. The claim that without legitimate 
variation human rights cannot have determinate content implies, as it were, that the 
meaning of human rights consists in whatever dif- ferent ’democratic variations’ decide it 
is, and nothing more. But if human rights are expressible as moral principles then all 
variations will have one thing in common: that they fit the principles. The right to 
freedom from slav- ery, for example, will vary in its application given what we take 
ownership over persons to mean, and our understanding of that might develop over time; 
we might come to understand that human trafficking is an example of treating  
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persons as property. But the cases covered by the right will have one thing in common: 
that they deal with treating persons as property. Or take a socio- economic right, like 
claims to health insurance. What counts as wrongful in terms of health insurance 
provisions will vary with the available resources and associated burdens of providing it. 
What constitutes a genuinely available resource or acceptable burden (say in the form of 
taxes) morally speaking will itself depend on principles of fair or reasonable trade-offs 
between benefits (health provisions) and tax burdens (see Meckled-Garcia 2013, pp. 
77ff.). That may vary from society to society. It may require a degree of interpretation on 
a case-by-case basis, as to whether a given burden is reasonable. But none of that means 
that the only correct interpretations are those endorsed by the demos. On the contrary, 
they are valid when they fit the principles, and fail to be valid when they do not, which is 
a general interpretative matter on which the view of the demos is just one among others. 
Nothing in collective delibera- tion guarantees infallibility. Of course, if one thinks there 
can be no right answer as to how to interpret moral principles, then any answer is as right 
as the next. But I assume Benhabib is not engaged in that kind of scepticism, and even if 
she were it would still not give priority to the democratic answer which would merely be 
one answer among many.  
All that aside, there is the wholly different question of whether one or other given 
interpretation should be decisive as a matter of legal and social arrangements. Of course 
that question depends on decision-making procedures in a society and decision-making 
procedures can be legitimate or illegitimate. Whatever the correct interpretation of a right 
might be, in a social context other imperatives will rightly influence what interpretation 
we must collectively accept as authoritative. There is the question of what is socially 
achievable given current understandings and how to adjudicate disputes over interpreta- 
tions so that the rule of law prevails. Both considerations might vary which interpretation 
of a right ought to prevail in different political communities. Yet, when a variation 
reaches beyond certain limits one must say that it is not even an attempt show communal 
concern for members, and then legitimacy, not only justice, is in jeopardy.  
The moral aim of legitimacy is to describe the limits within which political communities 
can vary on their understanding of justice and outside of which we are lead to question 
whether we have political community (as opposed to tyranny and rule by violence) at all. 
Justice concerns what fully fledged social equality might demand, and that will include 
theories of equality in social deliberation. Getting it wrong about justice, or the ideal of 
political equality, need not mean getting it so wrong as to make our institutions 
illegitimate. Benhabib’s argument is that the best theory of political equality, democracy, 
is the only viable account of legitimacy, but that argument conflates the demands of 
justice with the conditions for legitimately trying to get justice right.  
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